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INVALID HARMS: 
IMPROPER USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT’S GOOD CAUSE EXEMPTION 
Miriam R. Stiefel 
Abstract: On October 13, 2017, the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 
U.S. Department of Treasury, and U.S. Department of Labor published two nearly identical 
interim final rules in the Federal Register. To do so, the agencies invoked the Administrative 
Procedure Act’s good cause exemption, permitting the rules to bypass prepromulgation notice 
and comment rulemaking requirements. The interim final rules allowed employers and insurers 
that provide group healthcare coverage under the Affordable Care Act to seek constitutional 
and moral exemptions—specifically for contraceptives and other preventive health services 
coverage. Using the two 2017 interim final rules as an illustration, this Comment considers 
whether constitutional and moral objections should qualify as valid reasons for administrative 
agencies to invoke the Administrative Procedure Act’s good cause exemption, ultimately 
arguing they should not. If valid, this use of constitutional and moral objections would broaden 
administrative agencies’ ability to bypass notice and comment rulemaking procedures, thereby 
delegitimizing the rulemaking processes and undercutting opportunities for public 
participation. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Administrative Procedure Act1 (APA) governs how federal 
administrative agencies promulgate rules.2 Generally, to promulgate rules, 
administrative agencies must comply with the APA’s public disclosure 
and participation requirements referred to as “notice and comment 
rulemaking.”3 Recognizing that notice and comment rulemaking could 
take months or years to complete, Congress established the good cause 
exemption,4 permitting agencies to bypass the notice and comment 
                                                     
 J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. Thank you to Professor 
Kathryn Watts for her inspiring law lectures, guidance, and comments. Additionally, thank you to the 
Washington Law Review editorial staff for their exceptional work. 
1. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. For example, the “‘interpretive rule’ exception allows agencies to skip notice and comment when 
the rule to be promulgated merely clarifies or explains an existing statute or rule.” Kristin E. Hickman 
& Mark Thomson, Open Minds and Harmless Errors: Judicial Review of Postpromulgation Notice 
and Comment, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 261, 264 (2016). There are additional exemptions concerning 
military action, foreign affairs, internal agency procedures, and general statements of policies. 
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1)–(2). 
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procedures. The APA’s good cause exemption permits agencies to quickly 
enact regulations in emergency situations,5 while protecting the public 
from agency abuse of this speedy option.6 Essentially, Congress 
established the APA’s good cause exemption to act as an emergency exit 
door—to be used sparingly and under special circumstances.7 
Under the Donald J. Trump Administration, on October 13, 2017, the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in collaboration 
with the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) and the U.S. Department 
of Labor (DOL), introduced two nearly identical interim final rules 
(IFRs): the “Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of 
Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act”8 (2017 
Religious IFR) and the “Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for 
Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act”9 
(2017 Moral IFR). The IFRs established exemptions for employers and 
insurers with religious and moral objections from the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) contraceptive coverage requirement.10 
After their introduction, many states and nonprofit organizations filed 
lawsuits challenging the IFRs’ legality under the U.S. Constitution and 
APA.11 On November 15, 2018, the agencies issued two Final Rules 
(FRs), solidifying the 2017 IFRs.12 In December 201813 and January 
2019,14 federal courts granted complaining states injunctive relief, finding 
that both the IFRs’ and FRs’ harms outweighed their benefits and that the 
rules were contrary to the ACA. Accordingly, the rules are no longer in 
effect. Nonetheless, the process used by the agencies to create the rules 
raises questions about whether constitutional or moral harms are valid 
reasons to invoke the APA’s good cause exemption. 
                                                     
5. See infra Part I. 
6. See Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 293; infra Part I.  
7. See infra Part I. 
8. Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under 
the Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,792 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. 
2590, 45 C.F.R. 147) [hereinafter 2017 Religious IFR]. 
9. Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 47,838 (Oct. 13, 2017) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. 
2590, 45 C.F.R. 147) [hereinafter 2017 Moral IFR]. 
10. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2713, 124 Stat. 119, 131–
32 (Mar. 23, 2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 (2018)).  
11. See infra Part II. 
12. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9. 
13. California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 570–71 (9th Cir. 2018). 
14. California v. HHS, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
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In deciding cases about the rules’ legality, the courts never directly 
addressed whether litigants could successfully argue that constitutional or 
moral harms are valid reasons for invoking the APA’s good cause 
exemption.15 In other words, there remains an open question: may 
administrative agencies rely on a constitutional issue, such as religious 
freedom, or a broad ethical issue, such as moralism, to invoke the good 
cause exemption? This Comment addresses that question. 
Specifically, this Comment considers whether constitutional and moral 
objections should qualify as valid reasons for administrative agencies to 
invoke the APA’s good cause exemption, ultimately arguing they should 
not.16 In considering these issues, Part I reviews the legislative history and 
intent behind the APA’s good cause exemption, as well as judicial review 
of the good cause exemption. Part II discusses the ACA’s contraceptive 
coverage requirement. It then explores subsequent litigation, legislation, 
and agency rulemaking that challenged the requirement—including 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores17 and the 2017 IFRs. Part III then uses the 
2017 IFRs to illustrate how constitutional and moral objections are invalid 
rationales for invoking the good cause exemption. If broadened to permit 
constitutional and moral rationales, the good cause exemption would 
cease to be an emergency exit, thereby threatening to end the public’s 
opportunity to participate in notice and comment rulemaking. 
I. THE APA’S GOOD CAUSE EXEMPTION 
As a participatory democracy, the U.S. government utilizes open 
forums and public participation in lawmaking.18 To legitimize these 
democratic values, Congress enacted the APA to govern federal 
                                                     
15. For example, instead of deciding whether constitutional or moral harms are invalid, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California balanced the plaintiff states’ interests with 
those of employers and insurance companies. The court held that the balance favored the plaintiff 
states’ interest “in ensuring that health plans cover contraceptive services with no cost-sharing, as 
provided for under the ACA.” Id. at 1298. For additional information see infra Part II. 
16. While this Comment acknowledges the many constitutional, statutory, and common law claims 
involved in the suits challenging the 2017 IFRs and 2018 FRs, it focuses on courts’ treatment of the 
APA’s good cause exemption for constitutional and moral harms. 
17. 573 U.S. 682 (2014). 
18. See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 4 (7th ed. 
2007) (“The framers held a strong bias in favor of lawmaking by representative assemblies, and so 
they viewed Congress as the prime national policy maker.”). 
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administrative agencies’19 formal and informal methods of rulemaking.20 
Pursuant to the APA, notice and comment procedures are an informal 
method of rulemaking that Congress enacted to safeguard public 
participation21 by providing interested parties the opportunity to weigh in 
on an agency’s prospective actions.22 “[B]y mandating ‘openness, 
explanation, and participatory democracy’ in the rulemaking process, 
these procedures assure the legitimacy of administrative norms.”23 
Agency action to solicit, review, and respond to public comments and 
questions serve Congress’s and the APA’s goals of transparency and 
public participation.24 However, due to the multiple steps involved—
drafting, reviewing, providing notice, commenting, and responding to 
comments—notice and comment rulemaking is often a time-consuming 
and cumbersome process.25 It may take months or years from the time an 
agency provides notice of its intended rule to the time it responds to 
comments in a final, published rule.26 
Recognizing that administrative rulemaking could be a lengthy 
process, Congress established the good cause exemption,27 permitting 
agencies to bypass the public disclosure and participation requirements of 
notice and comment in certain circumstances. The APA’s good cause 
                                                     
19. It is part of the President’s duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 3. To carry out this duty, Presidents have exerted control over administrative agencies, like 
HHS, and those agencies’ regulatory decisions. Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 
114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 688–89 (2016). The APA governs how administrative agencies may enact 
regulations. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). 
20. Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Requirements 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 320–21 (1989). Federalregister.gov is the 
primary platform facilitating public participation in agency rulemaking. About This Site, FED. REG., 
https://www.federalregister.gov/reader-aids/government-policy-and-ofr-procedures/about-this-site 
[https://perma.cc/XHD6-45BQ]. On this website, interested parties may review proposed and final 
agency actions, as well as submit comments and questions about proposed agency action. See FED. 
REG., https://www.federalregister.gov/ [https://perma.cc/DVK7-RYLD]. In certain instances, the APA 
requires agencies to publish responses to submitted comments in the final rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
21. 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
22. Id. § 553(c); see also Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 375 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (discussing Congress’s intent that the APA provide interested parties the ability to be heard 
by agencies), vacated on other grounds, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
23. Air Transp. Ass’n, 900 F.2d at 375 (citing Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1027 
(D.C. Cir. 1978)). 
24. See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
25. See Reg Map, U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., https://reginfo.gov/public/reginfo/Regmap/index.jsp 
[https://perma.cc/5LNW-CDWM]. 
26. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 291. 
27. Supra note 4. 
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exemption28 states that an agency is excused from notice and comment 
rulemaking “when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the 
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that 
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest.”29 
This Part focuses on the good cause exemption. It discusses the 
procedural steps agencies must take to invoke the good cause exemption 
and issue a rule, as well as the elements required to justify a rule. This Part 
then proceeds to explore the good cause exemption’s legislative history 
and intent, utilization by agencies, and judicial review. 
A. Legislative History and Intent 
When Congress enacted the APA in 1946,30 it clarified the good cause 
exemption requirements to ensure the exemption would not be used as a 
political lever.31 Court interpretations of Congressional intent explain that 
Congress designed the good cause exemption to be used in “situations of 
emergency or necessity,” as opposed to being used as “an ‘escape clause’ 
in the sense that any agency has discretion to disregard its terms or the 
facts. A true and supported or supportable finding of necessity or 
emergency must be made and published.”32 Thus, Congress enacted the 
good cause exemption “to accommodate situations where the policies 
promoted by public participation in rulemaking are outweighed by the 
countervailing considerations of effectiveness, efficiency, expedition, and 
reduction in expense, while assuring that agency decisions are based on 
facts.”33 Accordingly, administrative agencies are only to use the good 
cause exemption as an emergency exit door. 
Agencies invoking the good cause exemption tend to classify 
regulations published in the Federal Register as “interim final rules” or 
“final rules.”34 IFRs are “interim” because they announce an agency’s 
intention to publish a revised and final rule later.35 These rules are also 
“final” because they “take effect immediately upon publication or shortly 
                                                     
28. Id. at 264. 
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B).  
30. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946). 
31. Anne J. O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern 
Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 910–11 (2008). 
32. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing S. DOC. NO. 
79-248, at 200 (1946)). 
33. Lavilla, supra note 20, at 320–21. 
34. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 903. 
35. Id. 
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thereafter,” superseding a comment period.36 In other words, once an IFR 
is published, the agency invites comments37 and “indicat[es]that it may 
revise the rule in the future based on the comments it receives—thus 
leading to the label of an ‘interim-final’ rule.”38 A revised IFR is labeled 
as a “final rule” (FR).39 If a FR is not promulgated, an IFR may be relied 
on, essentially acting as a final rule.40 Alternatively, an IFR may include 
a sunset date by which it will lapse.41 Although the APA does not mandate 
that rules justified by the good cause exemption be interim, many are.42 
Because IFRs are required to engage in a postpromulgation notice and 
comment period, IFRs face less scrutiny than FRs, which become final 
regardless of a participatory period.43 Agencies typically justify 
publishing IFRs by using the good cause exemption.44 
The good cause exemption is touted for its flexibility but also criticized 
as a loophole.45 “There is a general public reluctance to permit an agency 
acting under a delegated authority to abandon the extensive checks on 
agency power” created by the APA.46 
When agencies limit affected persons’ ability to prepare for a new 
rule—e.g., by promulgating an IFR—this reluctance is heightened.47 
Skeptics of the good cause exemption argue that “it is hard to see why an 
agency would ever go to the trouble of undertaking prepromulgation 
notice and comment when it could more easily promulgate an interim-
final rule now and then undertake postpromulgation notice and comment 
more or less at its leisure.”48 
                                                     
36. Id. 
37. This Comment refers to the procedures before an IFR is published as a prepromulgation notice 
and comment period, and the procedures after an IFR is published as a postpromulgation notice and 
comment period. 
38. Michael Asimow, Interim-Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 731, 748 
(1999) (emphasis added). 
39. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 901–02. 
40. Id. at 903. 
41. Asimow, supra note 38, at 731 n.104. 
42. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018); see also O’Connell, supra note 31, at 948. 
43. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 902–03. 
44. Id. at 948. 
45. Lavilla, supra note 20, at 322 (citing K. WARREN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 280–94 (2d ed. 1988)). 
46. Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal Agency 
Emergency Powers, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3339, 3341 (2013). 
47. United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1105 (1977). 
48. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 293. Courts, agencies, and scholars use the terms 
postpromulgation or post-hoc to refer to comment periods that occur after an interim final rule is 
published in the Federal Register, as opposed to prepromulgation comments as part of “normal” notice 
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Administrative law scholar and University of Minnesota Professor of 
Law, Kristin Hickman, illustrates agency-specific abuse of the good cause 
exemption through Treasury’s rulemaking history.49 Hickman reported 
the following:  
Treasury and the IRS typically put a lot more effort into 
temporary Treasury regulations than proposed ones, for the 
simple reason that temporary regulations are legally binding and 
proposed ones are not. If agencies are less likely to take seriously 
postpromulgation comments than they are prepromulgation 
comments, it is hard to argue convincingly that postpromulgation 
notice and comment are a meaningful substitute for 
prepromulgation notice and comment.50 
Treasury’s pattern of issuing binding, yet “temporary,” regulations 
demonstrates how agencies circumvent the checks and balances put in 
place to prevent abuse: namely, prepromulgation notice and comment.51 
As Pepperdine University School of Law Professor Babette E.L. Boliek 
notes, “statutory language and structure of the ‘good cause’ exemption is 
so broad, and effective review of agency action so low, [] agency 
accountability and transparency are sacrificed.”52 The lack of 
accountability and transparency leaves agency rulemaking open to 
potential abuse of the good cause exemption. 
In the 1950s, some members of Congress sought “to limit the use of the 
good cause exemption in rulemaking to cases where ‘immediate adoption 
of the rule [was] necessary for the preservation of the public health, safety, 
or morals.’”53 However, the word “moral”54 was excluded from the APA’s 
amendments.55 Practicing administrative law attorney and Universidad 
Pontificia Comillas Professor Juan J. Lavilla explains Congress may have 
excluded the word because “‘morals’ expresses a value-laden concept 
lending itself to subjective interpretations,” and “the adoption of this 
proposal would not improve the exemption.”56 So while one Congress 
                                                     
and comment rulemaking. Id. at 263 nn.5–6, 273 (citing N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 
1038, 1049–50 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Boliek, supra note 46, at 3343–44. 
53. See Lavilla, supra note 20, at 324 (emphasis added) (citing S. DOC. 91-49, at 365 (1969)). 
54. Throughout this Comment the Author uses the terms “moral” and “morals” interchangeably 
when referring to the statutory and legislative history of the APA. 
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2018).  
56. See Lavilla, supra note 20, at 324 n.29. 
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member mentioned the word “morals” in discussions regarding amending 
§ 553,57 the term moral was excluded from the Act. 
In addition to the APA, Congress further expressed its intent for 
agencies to engage in notice and comment rulemaking through the 
promulgation of agency-specific statutes.58 Some agency-specific statutes 
explicitly cite § 553’s notice and comment rulemaking requirements.59 
While other agency-specific statutes do not explicitly cite the APA, they 
utilize the same notice and comment requirements.60 As long as agencies 
meet their respective agency-specific statutory requirements and comply 
with the APA, they may establish internal guidelines and procedures for 
informal rulemaking and the use of the good cause exemption.61 
Essentially, these procedures act as a guide and limit agency rulemaking.62 
Both Congress’s agency-specific statutes and agencies’ internal 
procedures bolster the APA’s requirements and their credibility. When 
neither Congress nor an agency has created additional statutes or 
procedures governing the use of the good cause exemption, agencies 
default to the APA’s rules.63 
B. An Agency’s Choice: Invoking the Good Cause Exemption 
Agencies invoke the good cause exemption frequently. According to 
the Government Accountability Office, “between 2003 and 2010 federal 
                                                     
57. Id. at 324–25. 
58. See supra notes 55–57. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is 
required to provide notice and comment for any rule revisions to comply with its 1992 equal 
employment opportunity provisions. 47 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1) (2018). The Federal Aviation 
Administration is required to engage in notice and comment rulemaking before amending “air tour 
management plan[s]” so that planes may fly over national parks and tribal lands. 49 U.S.C. 
§ 40128(b)(4)–(6) (2018). And, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required to engage in 
notice and comment rulemaking when modifying fuel regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2018). 
59. For example, the U.S. Department of Agriculture is required to abide by § 553 when 
consolidating or reforming milk marketing orders. 7 U.S.C. § 7253(b)(1) (2018). 
60. For example, HHS is required to hold a “public notice and comment period” before it modifies 
certain categories and classes of prescription drug coverage. 43 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(iii) (2018). 
61. For example, “the DEA has defined good cause in terms of whether ‘the conditions of public 
health or safety necessitate an earlier effective date.’” United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 
1104 (8th Cir. 1977) (emphasis in original). Also of note, courts typically afford agency guidelines 
and manuals some level of deference. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) 
(deferring to guidelines that an agency created without engaging in notice and comment rulemaking); 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (finding that a congressional statute granted an agency 
discretion to formulate guidelines). 
62. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing S. DOC. NO. 
79-248 (1946)). 
63. California v. HHS, 281 F.3d 806, 832 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
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agencies issued about 35% of major rules and about 44% of nonmajor 
rules without a notice of proposed rulemaking.”64 Of the rules 
promulgated without a notice of proposed rulemaking, “77% of major 
rules and 61% of nonmajor rules” invoked the good cause exemption.65 
Therefore, this emergency exit is starting to look like the main exit. 
There are numerous reasons an agency may invoke the good cause 
exemption. Stanford University Administrative Law Professor Anne 
Joseph O’Connell notes “[a]n agency’s choice of rulemaking 
process . . . is strategic.”66 The traditional notice and comment 
rulemaking process is often a long, drawn out, and costly process for 
agencies, especially during times of political divisiveness, when 
government agencies and political actors cannot easily come to a 
consensus about a rule.67 Thus, the good cause exemption provides 
agencies the flexibility to react quickly to emergencies or avoid political 
conflict, while assuring the public some level of postpromulgation 
review.68 However, Congress did not establish the good cause exemption 
for agencies to evade political scrutiny.69 Courts will invalidate IFRs when 
an agency clearly intended to avoid “high conflict public comment 
periods.”70 In other words, agencies may not avoid notice and comment 
procedures strictly for political reasons. 
Another prevalent reason agencies invoke the good cause exemption is 
compliance with immediate legislative (i.e., statutory) deadlines and court 
                                                     
64. JARED P. COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44356, THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION TO NOTICE 
AND COMMENT RULEMAKING: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTION 1, 1 n.2 (2016), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44356.pdf [https://perma.cc/GV5F-LWYR] (The GAO report adopted 
the definition of major rules in the Congressional Review Act, which distinguishes between major 
rules and nonmajor rules. Major rules are those determined by the office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) to, among other things, have or be likely to have an annual effect on the 
economy of $100 million or more. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2018)) (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF., GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO 
RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMMENTS (2012), https://www.gao.gov/assets/660/651052.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VX4U-4E67]). 
65. Id. at 1 n.3. In a study of the 4,658 final regulatory actions published in the Federal Register in 
1997, about half were published without a notice of proposed rulemaking. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFF., GAO/GGD-98-126, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES OFTEN PUBLISH FINAL ACTIONS 
WITHOUT PROPOSED RULES 2 (1998), https://www.gao.gov/assets/230/226214.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LN6S-YYFM]. 
66. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 917. 
67. Id. 
68. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 291. 
69. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 918. 
70. Id. 
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orders.71 For example, at issue in Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC72 was the 
agency’s published “propos[al] to eliminate all race- and gender-based 
provisions” of an existing rule for broadband wireless internet licenses.73 
While the FCC had not been ordered by a court or Congress to do so, it 
proposed this rule to avoid constitutional challenges in the wake of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors v. Peña,74 which 
held “strict scrutiny must be applied to all racially based government 
actions . . . [and] such actions ‘are constitutional only if they are narrowly 
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.’”75 The 
FCC’s regulations withstood challenges for lack of good cause, not on 
constitutional grounds, but because the FCC “was under a congressional 
deadline to act quickly”76 and a delay “would undermine the public 
interest by delaying additional competition in the wireless marketplace.”77 
Since the constitutional issues were litigated and decided in Adarand, the 
FCC had no reason to implicate the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution in its statement of reasons for issuing the rule.78 Instead, 
the FCC merely had to describe the litigation and time delay as a reason 
for issuing its rule.79 Together, these descriptions were enough for the 
FCC to establish a valid use of the good cause exemption. 
Additional reasons agencies invoke the good cause exemption tend to 
track Congressional intent: in response to emergency situations;80 to 
create interpretative rules rather than substantive or generally applicable 
                                                     
71. See generally EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the EPA validly invoked good cause exemption after litigation on the matter because 
public comment would not have provided new information); Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620, 
630 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding that the FCC validly invoked good cause to comply with a 
“congressional deadline to act quickly”); United Techs. Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(holding that the EPA validly invoked good cause to comply with statutory amendments); Am. Fed’n 
of Gov’t Emps. v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that while the USDA validly 
invoked good cause to comply with a court order and prevent public concern, the USDA did not have 
good cause to make the rule permanent). 
72. 78 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
73. Id. at 627. 
74. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
75. Omnipoint Corp., 78 F.3d at 627 (citing Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227). 
76. Id. at 630. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 636. 
80. See, e.g., Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that 
there was no statutorily-imposed emergent situation or another emergency present where the EPA 
relied on an emergent situation claim). 
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rules;81 and to promulgate internal agency regulations.82 As discussed 
further in Section I.C, an agency cannot shield its rule from judicial 
review by invoking any of the aforementioned good cause rationales. 
Procedurally, when an agency invokes the good cause exemption and 
issues a rule, it must provide “finding[s] and a brief statement of reasons” 
justifying its use.83 In United States v. Dean,84 the Eleventh Circuit upheld 
the Attorney General’s use of the good cause exemption because the 
Attorney General published its rule with an adequate statement of 
reasons.85 The statement of reasons provided guidance to “eliminate any 
possible uncertainty about the applicability of” the Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Act.86 The Eleventh Circuit also held that 
the Attorney General had properly invoked the good cause exemption 
because its use avoided the potential procedural delay of reregistering sex 
offenders during a notice and comment period, which could “do real 
harm” to the public.87 
In the absence of either findings or a statement of reasons, courts will 
invalidate a rule on procedural grounds without considering the merit of 
the agency’s good cause exemption. Likewise, courts will invalidate a rule 
if the substance of its findings or statement of reasons is inadequate. 
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. FERC88 illustrates courts’ unwillingness to 
uphold IFRs without proper findings and statements of reasons.89 In 
Tennessee Gas, the D.C. Circuit found the agency’s statement of evidence 
and reasoning for implementing the good cause exemption insufficient 
because it did not provide data, facts, or examples to support its 
reasoning.90 
Anytime an agency relies on the good cause exemption, it runs the risk 
that a court may invalidate the regulation on either procedural or 
                                                     
81. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 
2011) (holding that the TSA’s procedural changes were actually legislative and thus subject to notice 
and comment); United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a U.S. Park 
Service rule was invalid because it was substantive rather than interpretive). 
82. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce v. SEC, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (holding that the SEC 
did not satisfy good cause exception when it promulgated a rule in anticipation of management 
changes). 
83. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2018). 
84. 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2010). 
85. Id. at 1277. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 1281 (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
88. 969 F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 1145–46. 
13 - Stiefel.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2019  10:54 AM 
938 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:927 
 
substantive grounds.91 Because the aforementioned rationales—statutory 
deadlines, court orders, emergency situations, interpretive regulations, 
and internal agency operations—have, at times, passed judicial muster,92 
it is uncommon to find agency rules invoking good cause for any other 
reason. 
C. Judicial Review of Good Cause 
For courts to hold that an agency validly relied on the good cause 
exemption to promulgate an IFR, they must determine that § 553’s notice 
and comment requirements were “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary 
to public interest.”93 As discussed above, agencies’ use of the good cause 
exemption can be improper on procedural or substantive grounds. For 
example, a rule relying on the good cause exemption may be procedurally 
invalid because it was not “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
public interest” for the agency to go through notice and comment 
procedures.94 A rule relying on good cause may be substantively invalid 
because the agency failed to properly explain the harm it relied upon in its 
notice.95 If a court invalidates an agency’s rule for failing to follow proper 
procedures, there is no need to continue analyzing the rule—it is per se 
invalid.96 If an agency follows the correct procedures, a court will consider 
                                                     
91. See Section I.C for further discussion of judicial review of good cause exemptions. 
92. See supra notes 71 & 80–82. 
93. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2018). 
94. Id. 
95. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 317 (“[W]hen it appears that an agency haphazardly or 
pretextually claimed any of the statutory exemptions from notice-and-comment rulemaking 
requirements in an effort to either avoid bureaucratic hassle or expedite the agency’s policy 
preferences, a court could justifiably infer that the agency was unlikely to have taken 
postpromulgation public input seriously. Correspondingly, courts should also consider the time the 
agency spent considering comments before promulgating the rule in final form.”) (citing Advocates 
for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
96. In Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016), employees with 
the position of “service advisors” alleged that their automobile-employer violated the Fair Labor 
Standards Act’s (FLSA) overtime payment provision. Id. at 2120. In 2010, the U.S. Department of 
Labor (DOL) published an interpretation of the FLSA’s provision by defining “salesman.” Id. The 
Court considered whether DOL adequately explained its reasoning for considering certain comments 
persuasive when it issued the 2011 rule. Id. at 2120, 2127. The Court held that DOL failed to meet its 
procedural requirements, so the rule’s definitions would not be afforded Chevron deference. Id. at 
2126–27. Because the lower courts relied on the definitions from a procedurally flawed rule—and in 
doing so the lower court improperly provided DOL with Chevron deference—the Court vacated the 
lower court’s judgment and remanded the case. Id. By 2018, Encino Motorcars had made its way 
back to the Court to determine whether, without regard to administrative deference, the term 
“salesman” encompasses the term “service advisors.” 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 (2018). The 
Court found that it did. Id. 
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whether or not to afford that agency’s rule some level of deference.97 This 
Section broadly discusses the tools courts use to review agency decisions, 
as well as the factors courts consider when reviewing good cause 
exemptions. 
1. Standard of Review for Good Cause 
When drafting the APA, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
imposed upon the courts the duty of preventing agencies from using the 
good cause exemption as a tool for avoiding the APA’s rulemaking 
requirements.98 To survive judicial scrutiny, the “[c]ause found must be 
real and demonstrable.”99 To determine whether the cause relied upon is 
real and demonstrable, courts consider whether an agency “provide[d] the 
requisite specific and particularized explanation that the courts require to 
substantiate a valid good cause claim.”100 As briefly discussed in 
Section I.B, “courts tend to be skeptical of generic assertions of a need for 
immediate guidance” or regulation absent notice and comment.101 For that 
reason, “courts generally limit the scope of the [good cause] exception to 
truly unusual circumstances, such as when public safety is threatened or 
advance notice of a rule might undermine its application.”102 That being 
said, courts’ consideration of whether an agency “properly invoked ‘good 
cause’ proceeds case-by-case, sensitive to the totality of the factors at 
play.”103 
Courts generally review agencies’ good cause actions de novo or with 
a mix of de novo and arbitrary and capricious review.104 Pursuant to § 706 
of the APA,105 courts review agencies’ good cause actions de novo in at 
least three instances: (1) when agency decisions involve constitutional 
                                                     
97. Id. 
98. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing S. REP. NO. 79-
752, at 31 (1945)). 
99. Id. 
100. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 532 (2013). 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Alcaraz v. Block, 746 F.2d 593, 612 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 
1200 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
104. United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 506–09 (3d Cir. 2013). 
105. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2018). 
13 - Stiefel.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/2019  10:54 AM 
940 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:927 
 
matters;106 (2) when agency decisions interpret judicial opinions;107 and 
(3) when agency decisions implicate rulemaking procedures.108 De novo 
review may overlap with arbitrary and capricious review when there are 
claims of procedural deficiencies.109 In fact, § 706 explicitly provides that 
courts should “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and 
conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”110 
Courts may use § 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary and capricious standard as a 
fallback when they find that the agency’s reasoning conflicts with 
statutory intent or the agency fails to provide any reasoning at all.111 For 
example, in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.,112 the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration revoked a seatbelt regulation.113 The Court, using arbitrary 
and capricious review, found that the agency’s rescission of the seatbelt 
regulation conflicted with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety 
Act’s intent to reduce traffic accidents and improve traffic standards,114 
and the agency “failed to supply the requisite ‘reasoned analysis’” for the 
rescission.115 Therefore, the agency’s action was unlawful under the APA. 
The Court held the arbitrary and capricious standard to be the correct 
standard of review to determine whether (1) an agency’s decision to 
revoke a regulation conflicts with statutory intent and (2) an agency 
provided reasoning for its actions.116 
Because courts may review agencies’ use of the good cause exemption 
de novo or under arbitrary and capricious review, the circuits are split 
regarding whether some level of deference can be afforded to “an 
agency’s assertion of good cause under § 553(b)(B).”117 Under arbitrary 
                                                     
106. Id. § 706(2)(B); see, e.g., Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) (considering 
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause); St. Francis Hosp. Ctr. v. Heckler, 714 F.2d 872 (7th 
Cir. 1983) (considering the Fifth Amendment’s due process and equal protection clauses).  
107. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C), (D). 
108. Id. § 706(2)(D).  
109. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (1977). 
110. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
111. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41 (1983) (citing 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 414 (1971)).  
112. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).  
113. Id. at 34, 41. 
114. Id. at 48. 
115. Id. at 57. 
116. Id. at 33. 
117. United States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 884, 888, 890 (8th Cir. 2014) (holding that under de novo 
review and “even under an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, there is an insufficient 
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and capricious review, courts may afford an agency’s procedures and 
decisions some level of deference,118 but courts may not under de novo 
review.119 While some courts have skirted this issue,120 others have held 
that no deference should be afforded to agency good cause actions 
“although the [APA] itself presumes that review of agency action under 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard is ‘highly deferential.’”121 Thus, it 
remains an open question whether courts could properly afford some level 
of deference to agency decisions to invoke the good cause exemption.122 
2. Judicial Review of Constitutional Matters 
It is unusual for administrative agencies to enact IFRs solely on 
constitutional grounds, so there is little case law and literature analyzing 
judicial review of regulations invoking good cause for constitutional 
reasons. Therefore, it is beneficial to discuss how federal courts generally 
review constitutional matters. 
Typically, the federal judiciary avoids deciding constitutional 
matters.123 Traditional principles of separation of powers encourage the 
Judicial, Legislative, and Executive branches to stay in their lanes. Courts 
act strategically to stay in good standing with the legislature, executive, 
and public by avoiding hot-topic and value-laden issues, including 
constitutional issues.124 Courts are encouraged to keep peace with the 
legislature because Congress has the power to confirm and impeach 
judges, as well as expand and constrict judicial power,125 among other 
reasons. 
                                                     
showing of good cause for bypassing the APA’s requirements of notice and comment and pre-
enactment publication”) (first citing United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1105 (8th Cir. 1977); 
then citing United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 506–07 (3d Cir. 2013)); GARY LAWSON, 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 458 (7th ed. 2016) (citing Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507–09). 
118. Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 508. 
119. Id. at 506. 
120. Id. at 508. 
121. Mid Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 846 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (first citing 
Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); then citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 728 F.2d 1477, 1486–87 (Temp. Emer. Ct. 
App. 1983)). 
122. LAWSON, supra note 117, at 458 (first citing Reynolds, 710 F.3d at 507–09; then citing 
Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). 
123. See Neal K. Katyal & Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and 
Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2212, 2215 (2015); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional 
Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1202–08 (2006). 
124. See supra note 123. 
125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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Courts commonly employ the canon of constitutional avoidance to 
dodge deciding constitutional issues.126 In other words, a court reviewing 
an agency regulation, invoked to remedy a constitutional harm, will likely 
attempt to decide the matter without reaching the constitutional question. 
To avoid the merits of a constitutional claim, a court may rule on 
procedural or statutory grounds.127 The maneuver to avoid constitutional 
issues is a court’s way of leaving through its own emergency exit door. 
3. Additional Judicial Considerations of Good Cause 
Courts consider numerous factors to decide whether agencies properly 
invoked the good cause exemption. For example, courts consider whether 
Congress enacted a statute that imposes additional restrictions on the use 
of the good cause exemption or provided an alternative rulemaking 
exemption.128 If such a statute exists, courts may review its legislative 
history to understand Congress’s intent.129 Courts also consider whether 
agency-made guidelines impact rulemaking130 and whether the 
administrative record “offer[s any] other indications of an agency’s 
motives for foregoing prepromulgation notice and comment.”131 Another 
consideration is whether the court would do more harm than good by 
invalidating the regulation.132 
When reviewing good cause actions, courts generally hold that “an 
administrative agency is required to balance the necessity for immediate 
implementation against principles of fundamental fairness”133 regarding 
its impact on individuals. Courts also agree that “a balance . . . must be 
struck, even in time[s] of emergency, between regulatory efficiency and 
the procedural safeguards created to protect representative government, 
curb agency overreach, and promote agency transparency.”134 
While the good cause exemption is “a flexible standard, . . . courts have 
said that it ‘is to be narrowly construed and only reluctantly 
                                                     
126. See supra note 123. 
127. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, 666 F.3d 1216, 1222 
(9th Cir. 2012) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299–300 (2001)). 
128. For discussions regarding congressional intent, see United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 
218, 236 (2001), and Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 857 (1984). 
129. See Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 236. 
130. California v. HHS, 281 F.3d 806 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
131. Hickman & Thomson, supra note 4, at 317 (citing Advocates for Highway & Auto Safety v. 
Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). 
132. Hickman, supra note 100, at 471. 
133. United States v. Gavrilovic, 551 F.2d 1099, 1105 (8th Cir. 1977). 
134. Boliek, supra note 46, at 3341. 
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countenanced,’ with its use ‘limited to emergency situations.’”135 Yet, in 
Dean, the Eleventh Circuit held that to implicate the good cause 
exemption “there does not need to be an emergency situation . . . . [T]he 
[agency] only has to show that there is good cause to believe that delay 
would do real harm.”136 
Courts recognize that agencies are “not likely to be receptive to 
suggested changes once the agency ‘put[s] its credibility on the line in the 
form of “final” rules. People naturally tend to be more close-minded and 
defensive once they have made a “final” determination.’”137 In New Jersey 
v. EPA,138 the D.C. Circuit noted that creating an opportunity for 
postpromulgation comment is an insufficient remedy for failing to follow 
notice and comment rulemaking procedures.139 Therefore, agencies 
utilizing the good cause exemption and engaging in a postpromulgation 
comment period must demonstrate to courts that they are committed to 
keeping an open mind during the comment period and prior to enacting a 
final rule.140 
Courts have also addressed the question of whether statutory or court 
deadlines are sufficient reasons for invoking the good cause exemption.141 
At issue in Methodist Hospital of Sacramento v. Shalala142 was whether 
statutorily imposed implementation deadlines justified HHS’s use of the 
APA’s good cause exemption.143 The D.C. Circuit found the good cause 
exemption was justified because of the statute’s strict time constraints, 
noting that “[b]etween the April 20 enactment and the September 1 
deadline, the Secretary faced the daunting task of preparing regulations to 
implement a complete and radical overhaul of the Medicare 
reimbursement system.”144 Due to these time constraints, the court found 
                                                     
135. Nick Bagley, The New Contraception Rule Is Procedurally Flawed, TAKE CARE (June 1, 
2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-new-contraception-rule-is-procedurally-flawed [https://per 
ma.cc/JV7Z-7F7L] (quoting Util. Solid Waste Activities Grp. v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
136. United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010) (narrowly interpreting the good 
cause exemption). 
137. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Dep’t of Transp., 900 F.2d 369, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1990), vacated on 
other grounds, 933 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 
138. 626 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
139. Air Transp. Ass’n, 900 F.2d at 1049. 
140. New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1042. 
141. Id. (citing U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 213 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
142. 38 F.3d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
143. Id. at 1236. 
144. Id. at 1237. 
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that the Secretary of HHS had not abused the good cause exemption.145 
However, in U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA,146 the Fifth Circuit held that “the 
mere existence of deadlines for agency action, whether set by statute or 
court order, does not in itself constitute good cause for a § 553(b)(B) 
exception.”147 The EPA’s argument that complying with this particular 
congressionally imposed deadline constituted good cause for forgoing 
notice and comment did not persuade the court.148 Thus, while the good 
cause exemption could be implicated when Congress creates a statute or 
a court order imposes a strict deadline for agency action, the mere 
existence of deadlines for agency action is not necessarily enough to 
constitute good cause. 
Additionally, courts have held that the harm agencies claim in order to 
implicate the good cause exemption may not be overly general or broad.149 
In Sorenson Communications, Inc. v. FCC,150 the D.C. Circuit, reviewing 
an FCC action de novo, held that the record was “too scant to establish a 
fiscal emergency” and that while “no particular catechism is necessary to 
establish good cause, something more than an unsupported assertion is 
required.”151 Therefore, to uphold the good cause exemption, courts must 
find the harm claimed by agencies to be demonstrable and immediate—
like war, health crisis, or economic collapse.152 
While agencies may rely on the good cause exemption to address public 
health and welfare harms, courts must ensure those harms are immediate 
enough to warrant bypassing notice and comment procedures.153 For 
example, in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Goldschmidt,154 the Eighth Circuit 
upheld the use of the good cause exemption because the challenged rule 
generally addressed public concerns—the reservation of landing and 
takeoff times at airports.155 But, in United States Steel Corp., the Fifth 
                                                     
145. Id. (citing Council of S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 581 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(distinguishing the situation in New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1043–45, where a statutory deadline was 
“insufficient to establish good cause”)). For further discussion regarding statutorily imposed deadlines 
see Petry v. Block, 737 F.2d 1193, 1201–03 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
146. 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979).  
147. Id. at 213 (citations omitted); see also New Jersey, 626 F.2d at 1042 (citing U.S. Steel Corp., 
595 F.2d at 213). 
148. U.S. Steel Corp., 595 F.2d at 213. 
149. Id. at 214 (“This exception should be read narrowly.”). 
150. 755 F.3d 702 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
151. LAWSON, supra note 117, at 459 (citing Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc., 755 F.3d at 707). 
152. See U.S. Steel Corp., 595 F.2d at 214. 
153. See infra notes 154–58. 
154. 645 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1981). 
155. Id. at 1322. 
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Circuit considered whether the EPA properly invoked the good cause 
exemption to promulgate an FR regulating air quality standards for public 
health concerns156 and “held that public health concerns, while entitled to 
respect, would not have been seriously jeopardized by allowing public 
comment.”157 Therefore, for courts to find that an agency is entitled to the 
good cause exemption, that agency must articulate how delaying the 
effectiveness of a rule would jeopardize the public in some way. In other 
words, agencies must plead with particularization. 
Agencies may not waive prepromulgation notice and comment 
procedures unless their use of good cause is based on a real and immediate 
threat to public welfare. In American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler,158 
the Secretary of HHS raised a good cause claim “to protect life from 
imminent harm.”159 
The Secretary argue[d] that waiver [of APA notice procedures] is 
appropriate because ‘any delay would leave lives at risk.’ Such an 
argument could as easily be used to justify immediate 
implementation of any sort of health or safety regulation, no 
matter how small the risk for the population at large or how long-
standing the problem. There is no indication in this case of any 
dramatic change in circumstances that would constitute an 
emergency justifying shunting off public participation in the 
rulemaking.160 
Because the D.C. Circuit did not find the circumstances urgent, it 
invalidated HHS’s use of the good cause exemption.161 
As discussed, courts evaluate agencies’ uses of the good cause 
exemption to determine if the agencies’ reasons for and procedures used 
to invoke the good cause exemption are valid. To make these 
determinations, courts consider a number of factors, including a rule’s 
timing;162 legislative and judicial mandates;163 health and safety 
matters;164 and public concerns.165 From Dean to American Academy of 
                                                     
156. U.S. Steel Corp., 595 F.2d at 210. 
157. Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act’s Good Cause Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 113, 125 (1984). 
158. 561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). 
159. Id. at 401 (citations omitted). 
160. Id. 
161. Id. 
162. See supra text accompanying note 137. 
163. See supra notes 140–49. 
164. See supra notes 152–61. 
165. See supra notes 152–56. 
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Pediatrics, court decisions clarify which agency rationales constitute 
valid good cause.166 These factors and decisions will be revisited below 
when evaluating whether constitutional and moral harms constitute valid 
rationales for invoking the good cause exemption. 
II. AN ILLUSTRATION: EMPLOYER PROVIDED 
CONTRACEPTIVE COVERAGE 
A debate regarding whether or not agencies may invoke the good cause 
exemption for constitutional and moral harms recently ensued: On 
October 13, 2017, HHS, Treasury, and DOL, acting in concert, published 
two nearly identical IFRs in the Federal Register.167 The IFRs extended 
religious168 (i.e., constitutional) and moral169 exemptions to the ACA’s 
contraceptive coverage requirement. Under the IFRs’ exemptions, certain 
employers and insurers that must offer group healthcare coverage were no 
longer required to provide contraceptive care coverage to employees.170 
This Part provides a brief history of the ACA’s requirement that 
employers provide contraceptive coverage in employee health plans, 
including subsequent agency rulemaking and legal battles. Next, this Part 
discusses the Trump Administration’s IFRs and the lawsuits that 
followed. 
A. Historical Overview: Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives 
In 2010, Congress enacted the ACA.171 The ACA defines employers in 
different categories, such as a “small employer” with one but no more than 
100 employees and a “large employer” with at least 101 employees.172 
The ACA “requires employers with [fifty] or more full-time employees to 
offer ‘a group health plan or group health insurance coverage’ that 
provides ‘minimum essential coverage.’”173 “Minimum essential 
coverage” includes preventive care and screenings for adults and 
                                                     
166. United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2010); Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 
561 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1983). 
167. See 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9. 
168. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8, at 47,835. 
169. 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9, at 47,858. 
170. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8, at 47,808–13; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9, at 47,861–62. 
171. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-12 (2018)). 
172. Id. 
173. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 696 (2014) (citing 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 5000A(f)(2), 4980H(a), (c)(2) (2018)). 
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children.174 For individuals with reproductive capacity, preventive care 
and screenings include “Food and Drug Administration-approved 
contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and 
counseling, as prescribed by a health care provider.”175 Employers who 
are statutorily required, but do not provide health insurance coverage, may 
be fined per day and per employee they fail to cover.176 
Under the ACA, however, one category of employers may seek 
exemptions from covering certain essential health benefits. For example, 
the aforementioned preventive care and screening requirements for 
individuals with reproductive capacity “do[] not apply to health plans 
sponsored by certain exempt ‘religious employers.’”177 According to the 
ACA, religious employers like churches, non-profit hospitals, and private 
education institutions may obtain an exemption from sponsoring 
employee health plans with birth control benefits.178 Employees of 
religious employers who seek birth control coverage may have to pay out-
of-pocket or obtain independent insurance to cover related costs.179 
In 2011 and 2012, HHS, Treasury, and DOL published IFRs and 
notices of proposed rulemaking exempting employers of nonprofit 
organizations with religious objections to contraceptive services from 
providing such insurance coverage.180 The 2011 IFR, titled “Group Health 
Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” amended 
a July 2010 IFR.181 The amendments responded to the July 2010 IFR’s 
postpromulgation comments made by religious and non-religious 
employers concerned with maintaining their faith and complying with the 
ACA’s contraceptive coverage requirements.182 As amended, the 2011 
                                                     
174. Preventive Health Services, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/ 
preventive-care-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/TG44-KJEZ]. 
175. Preventive Care Benefits for Women, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/ 
preventive-care-women/ [https://perma.cc/G9PK-4TX7]; Birth Control Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/coverage/birth-control-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/5T99-R6RA]. 
176. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 696–97. 
177. Preventive Care Benefits for Women, supra note 175. 
178. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 698–99. 
179. Id. at 741–42. 
180. Id. at 698 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b) (2018)). 
181. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services 
Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,621–23 (Aug. 3, 2011) 
(amending Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to 
Coverage of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
41,726 (July 19, 2010)). 
182. Id. at 46,623. 
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IFR provided the Health Resources and Services Administration 
“additional discretion to exempt certain religious employers from the 
Guidelines where contraceptive services are concerned.”183 The 2011 IFR 
also amended the 2010 rules to align with state contraceptive mandates 
and exemptions by defining a religious employer as an organization that: 
“(1) [h]as the inculcation of religious values as its purpose; (2) primarily 
employs persons who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily serves 
persons who share its religious tenets; and (4) is a non-profit organization 
under . . . the [Internal Revenue] Code.”184 
The 2012 notice of proposed rulemaking, titled “Certain Preventive 
Services Under the Affordable Care Act,” proposed additional 
amendments to ACA-related regulations regarding contraceptive 
coverage and religious organizations.185 It stated that HHS, Treasury, and 
DOL were committed to developing “alternative ways of providing 
contraceptive coverage without cost sharing in order to accommodate 
non-exempt, non-profit religious organizations with religious objections 
to such coverage.”186 The agencies’ notice indicated their hope of 
balancing religious employers’ objections to providing contraceptive 
coverage with employees’ rights to preventive healthcare coverage, 
including contraceptives.187 
Despite the interim and proposed rules exemptions for contraception 
coverage, many religiously affiliated employers filed lawsuits asserting 
their First Amendment rights against the ACA mandate.188 These 
organizations claimed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)189 
provided a remedy to religious institutions.190 In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
                                                     
183. Id. 
184. Id. (citing I.R.C. §§ 6033(a)(1), (a)(3)(A)(i), (iii) (2018)). For more information on state 
contraceptive mandates and their exemptions, see Rachel VanSickle-Ward & Amanda Hollis-Brusky, 
An [Un]Clear Conscience Clause: The Causes and Consequences of Statutory Ambiguity in State 
Contraceptive Mandates, 38 DUKE J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 683, 683–708 (2013). 
185. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 
2012). 
186. Id. at 16,503. 
187. Id. 
188. Laurie Goodstein, Catholics File Suits on Contraceptive Coverage, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2012), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/22/us/catholic-groups-file-suits-on-contraceptive-coverage.html 
?mtrref=www.google.com (last visited May 10, 2019). 
189. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2018). 
190. Nick Bagley, Moral Convictions and the Contraception Exemptions, INCIDENTAL 
ECONOMIST: HEALTH SERVS. RES. BLOG (June 2, 2017, 9:45 AM), 
https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/moral-convictions-and-the-contraception-
exemptions/ [https://perma.cc/F978-9MLA]. 
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Stores, Inc., three closely held businesses191 brought an action claiming 
that HHS’s contraceptive mandate violated their First Amendment 
protected religious freedom, as well as RFRA.192 The U.S. Supreme Court 
held that the contraceptive mandate failed RFRA’s “least restrictive 
means of furthering that governmental interest” test.193 In doing so, the 
Court found that HHS’s contraceptive mandate imposed a substantial 
burden on employers of organizations that have religious objections to 
certain contraceptive methods and those employers’ exercise of 
religion.194 Employing the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Court 
did not consider the merits of the First Amendment claims.195 
In Wheaton College v. Burwell,196 a private liberal arts college brought 
a similar action as in Hobby Lobby, against HHS.197 Wheaton College 
challenged HHS’s contraceptive mandate and petitioned the Court for 
injunctive relief so that it would not be obligated to provide contraceptive 
coverage to its employees and students.198 HHS affords religious 
nonprofit organizations exemptions from the contraception coverage 
requirement if they complete certain forms.199 In this case, Wheaton 
College’s forms had not yet been approved.200 Like in Hobby Lobby, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reached its decision—to provide temporary 
injunctive relief so that Wheaton College would not be required to provide 
contraceptive coverage—without deciding the merits of the First 
Amendment claim.201 The Court considered another analogous claim 
against HHS’s contraceptive mandate in Zubik v. Burwell.202 In Zubik, the 
Court explicitly embraced the canon of constitutional avoidance by 
dodging the merits of the case: “the Court does not decide whether 
petitioners’ religious exercise has been substantially burdened.”203 
                                                     
191. A closely held business is “[a] corporation whose stock is not freely traded and is held by only 
a few shareholders (often within the same family).” Close Corporation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
416 (10th ed. 2014). 
192. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 701–702. 
193. Id. at 688, 694, 727–32 (citations omitted). 
194. Id. at 725–26. 
195. Id. at 735–36. 
196. 573 U.S. 958 (2014). 
197. Id. 
198. Id. at 958–59. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016). 
203. Id. at 1560. 
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Under the President Barack H. Obama Administration, HHS invoked 
the good cause exemption to comply with the Court’s Wheaton College 
order.204 Essentially, the Court’s order necessitated a rule change. As 
administrative law expert and University of Michigan Professor of Law 
Nick Bagley notes, court orders are “classic reasons to find good cause” 
actions valid.205 “Indeed, that’s why the D.C. Circuit brushed back an 
earlier challenge to one of HHS’s interim final rules: ‘the modifications 
made in the interim final regulations are minor, meant only to “augment 
current regulations in light of the Supreme Court’s . . . order.”’”206 As 
mentioned in Section I.C, the good cause exemption is generally 
appropriate when it is used to comply with court orders. 
B. Friday the Thirteenth: The Trump Administration’s Publication of 
IFRs 
On Friday, October 13, 2017, the Trump Administration’s HHS, 
Treasury, and DOL published two nearly identical IFRs in the Federal 
Register. The “Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage 
of Certain Preventive Services under the Affordable Care Act”207 and 
“Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act”208 provided religious 
and moral exemptions and accommodations to employers who provided 
healthcare coverage under the ACA. The IFRs allowed employers to 
claim an exemption in order to deny employees coverage for 
contraceptives and other preventive health services.209 The IFRs’ 
language was much broader than the exemptions already established in 
the ACA210 and the IFRs promulgated by the Obama Administration.211 
Unlike the Obama Administration’s IFRs, which invoked the good cause 
exemption to comply with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Wheaton 
                                                     
204. Bagley, supra note 135 (discussing Wheaton College, 573 U.S. 958; Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013); Interim Final 
Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive 
Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,726 (July 19, 2010)); 
see also Util. Solid Waste Activities Group v. EPA, 236 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
205. Bagley, supra note 135. 
206. Id. 
207. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8. 
208. 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9. 
209. Id.; 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8. 
210. Preventive Care Benefits for Women, supra note 175. 
211. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, supra note 185, at 16,503; Group 
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventive Services Under the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, supra note 181, at 46,622. 
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College order,212 the Trump Administration’s agencies argued that the 
ACA’s contraceptive mandate caused religious and moral harms to certain 
employers, justifying its use of the good cause exemption.213 
Generally, religion is defined as “[a] system of faith and 
worship . . . containing a moral or ethical code; esp., such a system 
recognized and practiced by a particular church, sect, or denomination. 
[C]ourts have interpreted the term religion broadly to include a wide 
variety of theistic and nontheistic beliefs.”214 The Trump Administration’s 
agencies asserted many rationales for promulgating the 2017 Religious 
IFR. First, the agencies claimed that many religious organizations could 
not afford to litigate to obtain the injunctive relief secured by Hobby 
Lobby.215 Second, the agencies stated that religious organizations suffered 
by complying with the ACA.216 Third, the agencies reasoned that invoking 
the good cause exemption was necessary to provide certain employers 
with immediate relief and to clarify uncertainties.217 Fourth, the agencies 
stated that in some instances the contraceptive coverage requirements 
“could serve as a deterrent for citizens who might consider forming new 
entities.”218 To prove that invoking the good cause exemption was 
necessary, the agencies cited RFRA, various legal battles, and disparate 
impact concerns as evidence.219 The 2017 Religious IFR made the ACA’s 
religious exemption available to any church or religious order, nonprofit 
organization, closely held organization, for-profit entity that is not closely 
held, non-governmental employer, institution of higher education, and 
health insurance issuer.220 
The 2017 Moral IFR relied on a moral harm rationale for invoking the 
good cause exemption.221 The moral exemption was much broader than 
the religious exemption. The term “moral” is defined be Merriam-Webster 
as, “of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior,” 
“expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior,” “conforming to a 
standard of right behavior,” “sanctioned by or operative on one’s 
                                                     
212. See supra note 204. 
213. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9. 
214. Religion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (10th ed. 2014). 
215. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8. 
216. Id. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at 47,814. 
219. Id. at 47,798–801 (citing Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014)). 
220. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8. 
221. 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9. 
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conscience or ethical judgment,” etc.222 In the 2017 Moral IFR, the 
agencies reasoned that while religious objectors were exempt from 
providing contraceptive coverage, neither the ACA nor past IFRs 
“offer[ed] an exemption or accommodation to any group possessing non-
religious moral objections to providing coverage for some or all 
contraceptives.”223 The 2017 Moral IFR’s statement of basis and purpose 
focuses on “individuals and entities with sincerely held moral 
convictions.”224 However, the actual language of the IFR does not 
explicitly define “moral convictions.”225 Instead, it provides blanket 
exemptions to any nonprofit organization and some for-profit 
organizations, such as universities and health insurers, that morally object 
to contraceptive coverage.226 The exemption is written as 
(2) The exemption of this paragraph (a) will apply to the extent 
that an entity . . . objects to its establishing, maintaining, 
providing, offering, or arranging (as applicable) coverage or 
payments for some or all contraceptive services, or for a plan, 
issuer, or third party administrator that provides or arranges such 
coverage or payments, based on its sincerely held moral 
convictions.227 
Moral conviction is defined broadly, and the term “coverage or 
payments” could be construed to mean that a person who morally objects 
to paying insurance coverage in general—rather than specifically objects 
to contraceptives—would also be exempt from providing such coverage. 
The inherent ambiguity and broadness of the term “moral” can be applied 
to many situations (i.e., euthanasia, abortion, gun control, mass 
incarceration, environmental protection), thus leaving room for further 
manipulation. 
While courts228 did not decide the validity of the agencies’ religious 
and moral harms claims, courts did permit lawsuits against the Trump 
                                                     
222. Moral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/moral [https://perma.cc/XK3T-TNL3]. 
223. 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9, at 47,839.  
224. Id. 
225. Id. (discussing the difference between “religious beliefs” and “moral convictions,” but not 
defining either). 
226. Id. at 47,862. 
227. Id. 
228. There were a number of additional cases—utilizing various arguments against the IFRs—
pending, including cases brought by states (e.g., Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Washington) and 
by nonprofit organizations (e.g., ACLU). See, e.g., Massachusetts v. HHS, 301 F. Supp. 3d 248 
(D. Mass. 2018) (granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment for lack of standing; currently 
on appeal to the First Circuit). While this Comment acknowledges the many constitutional, statutory, 
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Administration to move forward and, then, resolve those suits on other 
grounds.229 The continuance of these lawsuits means that courts generally 
found that the plaintiffs had standing, the issue was ripe for judicial 
consideration, and the plaintiffs met the preliminary injunction analysis 
by demonstrating their claims are likely to succeed. For example, in 
California v. HHS,230 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
California held that California had Article III and statutory standing to 
challenge the 2017 Religious and Moral IFRs when the court issued a 
preliminary injunction on December 21, 2017.231 However, in California 
v. Azar,232 the Ninth Circuit held that the injunction should be limited to 
the plaintiff states, rather than nationwide.233 The HHS Court found that 
the economic costs associated with “ensuring that women have access to 
no-cost contraceptive coverage” and interest in the “physical health and 
well-being of their citizens” satisfied Article III’s standing inquiry.234 
California met the APA’s standing requirements, expressed in 5 U.S.C. 
§ 702, because the IFRs operated as a final agency action that negatively 
impacted its citizens.235 
On November 15, 2018, the Trump Administration issued two FRs, 
solidifying the 2017 IFRs.236 Ironically, the publication of the 2017 IFRs 
and their postpromulgation comment period, satisfied the agencies’ notice 
and comment requirements for the 2018 FRs.237 Substantively, the 2018 
                                                     
and common law claims involved in these cases, it focuses on courts’ treatment of the APA’s good 
cause exemption for religious and moral harms. 
229. See, e.g., California v. HHS, 281 F. Supp. 3d 806 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff 
states had standing to sue), aff’d in part, California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 570–73 (9th Cir. 2018). 
230. 281 F. Supp. 3d 806 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
231. Id. at 822–23. 
232. 911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018) (originally filed as California v. Wright, No. 4:17-cv-05789 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2017)). 
233. Azar, 911 F.3d at 584. 
234. HHS, 281 F. Supp. 3d at 822.  
235. Id. at 822–23. 
236. See Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services 
Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 
C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain 
Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (codified at 
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) [collectively hereinafter 2018 FRs]. 
237. Professor Nicholas Bagley explains: 
Are the [final] rules legal? Procedurally, HHS is on safer ground now that it’s walked through 
notice and comment. To be sure, the courts are sometimes nervous when agencies issue interim 
final rules and purport to conduct notice and comment after the fact. If a rule has already gone 
into effect, the courts ask, isn’t the notice-and-comment process a farce? Does the agency, at that 
stage, really have an open mind about the comments it receives?  
Those concerns will certainly be in play here. Oddly enough, though, the fact that the courts put 
the initial rules on hold will play into the Trump administration’s hands. Because the interim 
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FRs were nearly identical to the 2017 IFRs.238 The states that participated 
in Azar, plus a few additional states, immediately challenged the FRs.239 
The 2018 FRs were the impetus for the Azar Court to, once again, question 
whether states had standing to sue HHS, Treasury, and DOL. On 
December 13, 2018, the Azar Court reached a partial decision,240 holding 
that the states had standing to sue241 and the controversies surrounding the 
IFRs would not be moot until the FRs’ January 14 effective date.242 In 
other words, as soon as the 2018 FRs became effective on January 14, 
2019, pending litigation surrounding the 2017 IFRs became moot because 
there was no longer a “live controversy.”243 Turning to the question of 
whether the agencies validly invoked the good cause exemption, the Azar 
Court considered the agencies’ claims that they had good cause to bypass 
standard procedures to (1) make rules effective immediately; (2) relieve 
burdened organizations with religious and moral beliefs; and (3) decrease 
insurance costs for organizations with religious and moral beliefs.244 
Without generally addressing religious and moral harms, the court found 
that none of these three claims were valid.245 
The night before the 2018 FRs became effective, the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of California granted plaintiff states an 
injunction, finding the states were likely to succeed in their arguments 
against both the 2018 Religious and Moral FRs.246 On remand, the district 
court noted that generally “the courts, not the agencies, are the arbiters of 
what the law and the Constitution requires.”247 The court also explained 
that the plaintiff states were likely to succeed “in their argument that the 
Moral Exemption is not in accordance with the ACA” and they were 
                                                     
final rules weren’t allowed to take effect, they acted in practice like proposed rules. And there’s 
nothing anomalous about taking notice and comment on proposed rules. 
Nicholas Bagley, The Trump Administration Targets the Contraception Mandate, INCIDENTAL 
ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/the-trump-
administration-targets-the-contraception-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/3TYU-Y7YF]. 
238. California v. HHS, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1279 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
239. Compare California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 584 (9th Cir. 2018) (California, Delaware, 
Maryland, New York, and Virginia), with HHS, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 1280 (California, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and District of Columbia). 
240. Azar, 911 F.3d at 566. 
241. Id. at 570. 
242. Id. at 568–69. 
243. Id. at 569. 
244. Id. at 576–78. 
245. Id. at 578. 
246. California v. HHS, 351 F.3d 1267, 1298–99 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
247. Id. at 1293.  
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“likely to suffer irreparable harm unless the Final Rules are enjoined to 
maintain the status quo pending resolution of the case on the merits.”248 
Notwithstanding these developments, neither court definitively 
addressed whether litigants could successfully argue that religious or 
moral harms are invalid reasons for invoking the APA’s good cause 
exemption. In other words, whether administrative agencies can rely on a 
constitutional issue, such as religious freedom, or a broad ethical issue, 
such as moralism, to invoke the good cause exemption remains an open 
question.  
The 2017 IFRs and 2018 IFRs illustrate how the Trump Administration 
used constitutional and moral harms to bypass notice and comment 
rulemaking.249 Part III discusses whether administrative agencies may 
validly rely on constitutional or moral harms to invoke the good cause 
exemption. This Comment ultimately concludes that constitutional and 
moral harms are invalid reasons to invoke the good cause exemption. 
III. INVALID HARMS 
As discussed in Part I, when determining the validity of an agency’s 
good cause exemption, courts will review the agency’s “finding and a 
brief statement of reasons” for issuing a rule.250 These statements must 
adequately explain why the traditional use of notice and comment 
procedures is “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.”251 Using the Trump Administration’s 2017 IFRs as an example, 
this Part argues that constitutional and moral objections are invalid 
rationales for invoking the APA’s good cause exemption. 
A. Capricious Constitutional Objection 
As discussed in Section II.B, litigation against the Trump 
Administration called into question the validity of its religious objection 
rationale for promulgating its 2017 Religious IFR without going through 
notice and comment.252 At the center of the Trump Administration’s 
religious objection rule was a First Amendment argument regarding 
employers’ religious freedom. This Section discusses the various ways 
rules invoking good cause for constitutional claims are invalid, as well as 
unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious. 
                                                     
248. Id. at 1296–97. 
249. See supra Section II.B. 
250. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (2018). 
251. Id. 
252. Supra Section II.B (referencing California v. Azar, 911 F.3d 558, 567 (9th Cir. 2018)). 
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First, many constitutional issues are resolved through litigation. After 
a constitutional claim is resolved in court, it would be unnecessary for an 
agency to invoke the good cause exemption to publish a rule advancing 
the same (i.e., the resolved) constitutional claim. However, this previous 
litigation argument could cut the other way. Courts have found good cause 
valid after litigation on the matter because public comment would not 
have provided new information.253 When good cause is valid after 
litigation on a constitutional matter, however, the use of the good cause 
hinges on the litigation or court order, rather than the constitutional matter 
alone.254 
The 2017 Religious IFR provides an example of why administrative 
agencies should not invoke the good cause exemption to promulgate a rule 
if the harm the rule claims to remedy has already been litigated and 
resolved. The content of the 2017 Religious IFR was similar to the Obama 
Administration’s rule amendments, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
rulings in Hobby Lobby, Wheaton College, and Zubik. By offering 
employers with religious objections an exemption to the contraceptive 
mandate, the 2017 Religious IFR was redundant.255 Because exemptions 
for employers with religious objections were provided through past 
rulemaking and litigation, the 2017 Religious IFR did not remedy an 
immediate risk of harm. Without a particularized and imminent harm, the 
2017 Religious IFR was arbitrary. 
California v. HHS demonstrates this line of reasoning. The HHS Court 
found that the Trump Administration’s claims would likely fail on the 
merits.256 Specifically, a court would likely find the Trump 
Administration’s contention that individuals are experiencing hardship 
waiting on pending RFRA lawsuits and “choos[ing] between the Mandate, 
accommodation, or penalties for [noncompliance]” were inefficient 
justifications for forgoing notice and comment rulemaking.257 Regardless 
of the 2017 Religious IFR, employers maintained the ability to file 
litigation to protect their First Amendment or RFRA rights, as well as to 
                                                     
253. See, e.g., EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA, 795 F.3d 118, 134–35 (D.C. Cir. 2015) 
(finding that the EPA validly invoked the good cause exemption to correct a previously, improperly 
invoked rule because “commentators could not have said anything during a notice and comment 
period that would have changed that fact.” In other words, a comment period would be unnecessary). 
254. See supra notes 71, 80–82. 
255. Zubik v. Burwell, 578 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
573 U.S. 682 (2014); Wheaton College v. Burwell, 573 U.S. 958 (2014). 
256. California v. HHS, 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 832 (N.D. Cal. 2017).  
257. Id. at 827 (alteration in original). 
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file for a waiver from providing contraceptive coverage with HHS.258 
Because employers with closely held religious beliefs were already 
protected and exempt from providing contraceptive benefits to their 
employees,259 there was no immediate threat to the employers’ wellbeing. 
Without an immediate harm, the 2017 Religious IFR lacked a justification 
to bypass notice and comment rulemaking. 
Additionally, previous litigation and subsequent corrective agency 
action under the Obama Administration260 resolved the Trump 
Administration’s concerns.261 The Obama Administration provided 
religious organizations exemptions from the ACA’s contraceptive 
mandates.262 Since the 2016 Zubik ruling, neither Congress nor an agency 
has enacted legislation or a rule that would substantially change the 
requirements of a religious institution to provide contraceptive coverage. 
Due to the fact that there were no changed circumstances—the public had 
not been subjected to a new, immediate, or greater harm—a court would 
have likely found that the 2017 IFRs were unnecessary. 
Omnipoint and the 2017 Religious IFR are both examples of agency 
rules that were not issued to comply with a court order—despite the 2017 
Religious IFR’s constitutional underpinnings.263 Since many IFRs are 
promulgated to comply with court orders or statutory mandates,264 it is 
odd that the 2017 Religious IFR was not a logical result of compliance 
with either a court order or statutory mandate. Unless a court order or a 
statute mandates that the agency promulgate a new rule, previously 
litigated or legislated constitutional issues moot the need to issue a rule 
without notice and comment.265 Without a mandate or other particularized 
rationale, it is arbitrary and capricious for an agency to promulgate a rule 
bypassing notice and comment procedures.266 
Second, constitutional issues are for Congress or courts to determine.267 
As discussed in Section I.C, the judiciary avoids making decisions on 
                                                     
258. California v. HHS, 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1277 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (order granting preliminary 
injunction).  
259. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682; see also supra Section II.A. 
260. See supra Section II.A. 
261. See supra Section II.B. 
262. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, supra note 185, at 16,503. 
263. Omnipoint Corp. v. FCC, 78 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1996); see 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8. 
264. See supra Section I.B. 
265. See supra Sections I.B, I.C. 
266. See supra Sections I.B, I.C. 
267. See supra Sections I.B, I.C. 
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constitutional issues.268 Given the structure of the three branches of 
government, the executive branch is responsible for leading and carrying 
out the laws, the judiciary is responsible for ensuring the laws are being 
carried out faithfully and adequately, and the legislature is responsible for 
drafting and expanding laws.269 Because Congress is the only body with 
the ability to proactively amend the U.S. Constitution, it should be the 
main constitutional speaker.270 Administrative agencies should take a 
chapter out of the judiciary’s playbook and also engage in constitutional 
avoidance. 
To demonstrate, consider the various tactics that the Azar Court did or 
could have done to avoid the 2017 Religious IFR’s constitutional issue: 
x The court could have avoided addressing the constitutional 
issue by invalidating the 2017 Religious IFR for procedural 
deficiencies. 
x The court could have avoided the constitutional issue by 
claiming Congress is in a better position to enact laws than 
the Judiciary or Executive (via administrative agencies). For 
example, the court could have found that Congress spoke to 
the issue of religious exemptions for contraceptives when it 
enacted the ACA.271 In fact, the ACA initially granted 
religious employers like churches, non-profit hospitals, and 
private education institutions an exemption from sponsoring 
employee health plans with contraceptive benefits.272 
Because Congress addressed the issue of religious 
exemptions when it enacted the ACA, the 2017 Religious IFR 
would be considered arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, 
Congress maintains the ability to broaden or narrow the 
ACA’s religious exemption. Applying this rationale to 
similar agency actions, courts should determine that 
Congress, rather than the Judiciary or Executive, are better 
equipped to effectuate the public will.273 
x The court could have avoided ruling on constitutional 
grounds by claiming the constitutional harm addressed by the 
2017 Religious IFR was previously litigated and resolved by 
Hobby Lobby, Wheaton College, and Zubik, and the Obama 
                                                     
268. See supra Section I.C. 
269. U.S. CONST. arts. I–III. 
270. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
271. I.R.C. § 5000A(d)(2) (2018). 
272. Id. § 1402(g). 
273. Supra Sections I.B, I.C. 
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Administration’s IFRs.274 The court could have argued that 
this precedent resolved the constitutional issue, rendering the 
2017 Religious IFR unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious. 
Even when courts engage a constitutional issue, they tend to argue that 
the constitutional issue is best left for Congress, rather than an agency or 
court to resolve. This comes back to the principles of separation of powers 
and the judiciary’s goal of maintaining peace between itself and the 
Legislative and Executive branches.275 Thus, to dodge constitutional 
issues, courts are likely to (1) focus on the IFR’s procedural flaws; 
(2) argue Congress is in a better position to enact laws than the Judiciary; 
or (3) claim that since the constitutional issue was previously litigated and 
resolved, the IFR is unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious.276 
Third, constitutional issues are broad and have the potential to impact 
large swaths of Americans. For that reason, constitutional issues are of 
great importance to the American public and should require notice and the 
opportunity to comment. With the time constraints and costs of 
rulemaking,277 constitutional issues should be left to Congress. Unless an 
agency takes the time to employ proper notice and comment procedures, 
Congress will arguably be more representative than agencies and impose 
more checks and balances than agencies. 
B. Misguided Moral Objection 
Congress, federal courts, and commentators have expressed concerns 
that agencies may abuse the good cause exemption.278 This is a concern 
that the good cause exemption and the administrative agency’s political 
leanings will overcome public participation.279 Political abuse is apparent 
when agencies use the good cause exemption on hot-topic or political 
issues,280 such as contraceptive coverage,281 to bypass the lengthy notice 
and comment rulemaking procedures. This abuse is also evident when the 
good cause exemption hinges on broad and subjective reasoning,282 such 
                                                     
274. Supra note 255. 
275. Supra Section II.C.2. 
276. See supra note 253. 
277. See supra Part I. 
278. See supra Part I. 
279. O’Connell, supra note 31, at 910–11. 
280. Id. 
281. For up-to-date news regarding contraceptive coverage see Contraception and Insurance 
Coverage (Religious Exemption Debate), N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/topic/subject/ 
contraception-and-insurance-coverage (last visited May 10, 2019). 
282. See supra Section II.B. 
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as a moral objection. This Section discusses the various ways rules 
invoking good cause for moral objections are invalid. 
As discussed in Part I, the very nature of the good cause exemption is 
already broad and subject to agency abuse. The availability of the good 
cause exemption as a method for agencies to bypass the traditional notice 
and comment procedures is one that Congress intended to be used 
sparingly and in times of emergency.283 Courts have affirmed this specific 
instance of congressional intent—or more accurately, courts have 
affirmed congressional avoidance of the term moral—in numerous 
cases.284 For example, in American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, the 
D.C. Circuit found an interim rule dealing with moral and ethical concerns 
to be arbitrary and capricious because “had Congress intended [§ 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794] to reach so far into such 
a sensitive area of moral and ethical concerns it would have given some 
evidence of that intent.”285 The Court believed that the decision to clarify 
and amend the Rehabilitation Act to address moral concerns was 
Congress’s,286 noting that Congress may clarify and amend a statute if 
intended to cover moral and ethical concerns.287 Additionally, while one 
Congress member mentioned the word “moral” in discussions regarding 
amending § 553, the term “moral” was excluded from the APA.288 In 
addition to leaving out the term “moral” in the APA, Congress avoided its 
use in HHS-related statutes, such as the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.289  
Viewing the 2017 Moral IFR as an example, the HHS Court addressed 
and dismissed the Trump Administration’s moral harm rationale.290 The 
court noted that the moral objection “markedly expanded the scope of the 
exemption available to religious entities under the ACA’s contraceptive 
coverage mandate, and created an entirely new exemption based on moral 
objections.”291 The moral exemption to the ACA’s contraceptive mandate 
                                                     
283. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 214–15 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the 
EPA “failed to show [a] strong enough reason to invoke the § 553(b)(B) exception” and that the 
“exception should be read narrowly”; reasoning that if the court were to accept the EPA’s reasoning, 
it would “make the provisions of § 553 virtually unenforceable”). 
284. See supra Section II.B. 
285. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 402 (D.D.C. 1983). 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
288. Lavilla, supra note 20, at 324 n.29. 
289. See Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, 561 F. Supp. at 402. 
290. California v. HHS, 281 F.3d 806 (N.D. Cal. 2017). 
291. Id. at 813. 
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broadens the scope of the ACA so greatly that notice and comment 
procedures were warranted.292  
The broad scope of the moral objection would have caused the 2017 
IFRs to be arbitrary and capricious. In addition to providing employers 
exemptions, the IFRs permitted health insurance companies to utilize 
these exemptions.293 Therefore, insurance companies owned or managed 
by individuals with religious or moral objections to providing group 
health insurance coverage of contraceptives and other preventive care 
could have obtained an exemption from doing so.294 With employers and 
insurance companies opting-out of providing contraceptive coverage, 
individuals’ access to contraceptives and preventive health care would be 
severely limited. This limitation conflicted with the ACA’s goal of 
making comprehensive and “affordable health insurance available to more 
people.”295 
Additionally, like in American Academy of Pediatrics, a court could 
find that, when the ACA was enacted and subsequently amended, 
Congress had the opportunity to include a moral exemption. Congress 
could have and, in the future, may broaden or narrow the ACA’s 
exemptions. Because Congress addressed the issue of contraceptive 
coverage, the Trump Administration’s decision to promulgate the 2017 
IFRs was arbitrary and capricious. 
The broad and subjective nature of the term “moral” may be why, until 
the Trump Administration, agencies had not relied on a moral claim. In a 
legal sense, moral typically refers to “the study . . . of human conduct, of 
right and wrong behavior.”296 The broad scope of what constitutes a moral 
objection opens the door to agency—and in the case of the 2017 IFRs, 
possibly employer—abuse. And, one could argue that such a broad harm 
likely fails New Jersey’s requirement that harms be real and 
demonstrable.297 Thus, while a moral harm may seem like a novel way to 
avoid notice and comment rulemaking, it should be an invalid use of the 
good cause exemption. Just as Congress has the power to amend the ACA, 
it also has the power to amend § 553 of the APA to specify what 
                                                     
292. Id. 
293. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9. 
294. 2017 Religious IFR, supra note 8; 2017 Moral IFR, supra note 9. 
295. Affordable Care Act, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/affordable-
care-act/ [https://perma.cc/3R6S-MU3M]. 
296. Moral, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (10th ed. 2014). 
297. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing S. DOC. NO. 
79-248, at 200 (1946)). 
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constitutes good cause.298 Essentially, Congress’s power to amend the 
good cause exemption acts as a check on administrative agencies. If 
agencies continue to improperly rely on moral harms to invoke the good 
cause exemption,299 Congress should amend the APA; reminding the 
agencies that when an emergency exit door is opened an alarm bell rings. 
C. Two Objections are Not Better than One 
When two identical IFRs are published in the Federal Register—
regardless of the validity of the individual rules—courts should be 
skeptical. Courts should be concerned that the publication of two nearly 
identical rules are (1) unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious; (2) a 
political ploy to avoid the traditional and lengthy notice and comment 
rulemaking; or (3) both. Using the 2017 IFRs as an illustration, this 
Section explores two reasons courts should find that an agency cannot 
validly rely on the good cause exemption to publish multiple nearly 
identical IFRs. 
First, courts should find that two nearly identical rules are unnecessary, 
arbitrary, and capricious. Considered together, the 2017 Religious and 
Moral IFRs were redundant. This redundancy would have rendered the 
2017 IFRs unnecessary, arbitrary, and capricious. For instance, the broad 
scope of the 2017 Moral IFR may have covered the 2017 Religious IFR 
and vice versa. In other words, the agencies could have reached the same 
aims and results by promulgating one instead of two IFRs. 
The dictionary definitions, referenced in Part II,300 help explain how 
the 2017 Moral IFR makes the 2017 Religious IFR redundant: Moral is 
defined as “of or relating to principles of right and wrong in behavior,” 
“expressing or teaching a conception of right behavior,” “sanctioned by 
or operative on one’s conscience or ethical judgment,” etc.301 Religion is 
defined as “[a] system of faith and worship . . . containing a moral or 
ethical code . . . . [C]ourts have interpreted the term religion broadly to 
include a wide variety of theistic and nontheistic beliefs.”302 Because the 
definition of religion contains the phrase “a moral or ethical code”303 in 
some instances, it may cover moral beliefs and vice versa. Similarly, 
because the definition of moral contains “ethical judgment,” in some 
                                                     
298. See supra Section I.A. 
299. See supra Section II.B. 
300. See supra Section II.B. 
301. Moral, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (2018), https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/moral [https://perma.cc/XK3T-TNL3]. 
302. Religion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1482 (10th ed. 2014). 
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instances, it may cover religion’s “theistic and nontheistic beliefs” and 
vice versa. 
Given these definitions, an individual with a religious objection to 
contraceptive coverage may have achieved the same result by relying on 
the 2017 Moral IFR, and an individual with a moral objection to 
contraceptive coverage may have achieved the same aim by relying on the 
2017 Religious IFR. When either one of the 2017 IFRs was promulgated, 
it eliminated, or at least relieved, the emergency situation that the agencies 
relied on to invoke the good cause exemption and promulgate the other 
2017 IFR. Therefore, as soon as one of the 2017 IFRs was published, the 
other IFR became redundant, unnecessary, and arbitrary. Courts should 
look skeptically at two nearly identical rules, like the 2017 IFRs, to 
determine whether there is an emergency warranting the double use of the 
notice and comment exemption and whether the that double use is 
necessary. 
Second, when faced with two nearly identical rules, courts should ask: 
Did the agency publish these rules as a political maneuver? And, was it 
the agency’s goal to avoid the lengthy notice and comment rulemaking 
procedures? To answer these questions, courts must look at the rules’ 
substance, procedures, and context. An agency could publish two nearly 
identical rules as a form of insurance: if a court invalidates one rule—on 
substantive or procedural grounds—the agency may still enforce the other 
rule. In other words, duplicative rules could be deployed on newsworthy 
topics in anticipation of litigation. Using the 2017 IFRs as an illustration, 
HHS, Treasury, and DOL may have reasoned that if the 2017 Religious 
IFR was invalidated, the 2017 Moral IFR could remain in place. If that 
were the case, because the 2017 Moral IFR was broad enough to capture 
the same aim as the 2017 Religious IFR, the agency would still have 
achieved its initial goal. The strategy of publishing two rules in 
anticipation of litigation would impermissibly allow agencies to escape 
the participatory notice and comment rulemaking requirements. Thus, 
courts should invalidate rules employed using this type of agency action. 
Similarly, courts may review the context in which an agency published 
two nearly identical rules and find that the agency published them to avoid 
a lengthily notice and comment period because the rules touch on a 
politically contested issue. Using the 2017 IFRs as an illustration, a court 
could look at the rules’ context and conclude that the agencies published 
them as political tools to restrict access to contraceptives and other 
preventive health services while escaping public discourse via a notice 
and comment period. As the Ninth Circuit noted when granting plaintiff 
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states injunctive relief in California v. Azar,304 courts should find that the 
agencies impermissibly used the 2017 Religious and Moral IFRs to escape 
notice and comment rulemaking.305 When courts find that an agency 
improperly relied on the good cause exemption to escape notice and 
comment rulemaking for political reasons, they must void the rule.306 
When two duplicative rules are at issue, courts should consider voiding 
both rules. 
In sum, two nearly identical rules are not better than one rule. Courts 
should find nearly identical rules redundant and therefore unnecessary, 
arbitrary, and capricious. Additionally, when agencies publish two nearly 
identical rules, courts should be skeptical of their use as a political ploy to 
avoid the notice and comment rulemaking. 
CONCLUSION 
Constitutional and moral harms are invalid reasons for invoking the 
APA’s good cause exemption to notice and comment rulemaking. The 
Trump Administration’s 2017 interim final rules—which broadened 
contraceptive coverage exemptions for employers with religious and 
moral objections—provide an illustration. 
The 2017 IFRs invalidly relied on the APA’s good cause exemption to 
the time-consuming, but more democratic, notice and comment 
rulemaking procedures. First, past legislation, litigation, and agency 
rulemaking resolved the First Amendment issues the agencies relied on to 
promulgate the 2017 Religious IFR. Without changed circumstances, the 
2017 Religious IFR was unnecessary because the public had not been 
subjected to a new, immediate, or greater harm. Second, the 2017 Moral 
IFR was overly broad and impermissibly expanded the good cause 
exemption from its purpose as a “safety valve” to an “escape hatch.” 
Third, the publication of two nearly identical IFRs was redundant, 
unnecessary, and arbitrary. The publication of the 2017 Moral IFR 
eliminated the emergency situation that the agencies relied on to invoke 
good cause and promulgate the 2017 Religious IFR. In general, when 
agencies publish nearly identical rules, courts should review those rules 
skeptically to ensure the rules are not being used to escape notice and 
comment rulemaking procedures. 
The use of constitutional and moral objections will broaden 
administrative agencies’ ability to bypass notice and comment rulemaking 
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proceedings and delegitimize the rulemaking process. Repeated use of 
constitutional and moral objections to invoke the good cause exemption 
will endanger the participatory government principles that Congress 
proscribed when it promulgated the APA’s notice and comment 
rulemaking requirements. In sum, administrative agencies should not rely 
on constitutional or moral harms to invoke the good cause exemption. 
And, if agencies do rely on them, Congress and the courts should remind 
the agencies that when they open an emergency exit door, an alarm bell 
rings. 
